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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












WILLIAM SANDSTROM, AMY KAUNAS, KEN HUGENDUBLER, HARRISBURG 
AREA HUMANE SOCIETY, AND JOHN DOE (aka OFFICER WEAVER)  
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-09-cv-01557) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 27, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed January 25, 2012) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
    
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge:  
Miles D. Thomas appeals the District Court‟s denial of his motion to reinstate 
settled litigation.  He contends that the General Release he signed is void because he did 
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not voluntarily agree to release his claims.  Because Thomas fails to present any evidence 
that he did not enter into a validly enforceable agreement, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.   
I.  Background 
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
On July 26, 2009, William Sandstrom, a Humane Society Police Officer, 
confiscated Thomas‟s dog, Baron, for apparent violations of Pennsylvania‟s animal 
cruelty laws. Several days later, Thomas signed a release that transferred his ownership 
of Baron to the Harrisburg Area Humane Society.  Less than one month later, Thomas, 
believing that Sandstrom‟s seizure of Baron was unlawful and that Baron‟s transfer to the 
Humane Society was coerced, initiated this suit for violations of his civil rights.  
After several months of litigation, the District Court referred this matter to a 
Magistrate Judge for voluntary mediation.  Thomas was represented by counsel 
throughout the mediation.  The Magistrate Judge informed Thomas and his counsel on 
four separate occasions of the voluntariness of the mediation The mediation process 
culminated in the parties reaching an amicable agreement. As a condition of the 
settlement, Thomas was required to execute a General Release.  This document stated, in 
relevant part: 
For Sole Consideration of the return of the dog, Baron, to Miles Thomas, 
under the terms of the Foster Care Agreement . . . Thomas hereby releases 
and forever discharges William Sandstrom, Amy Kaunas, Ken 
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Hugendubler, The Harrisburg Area Humane Society and The Cincinnati 
Insurance Company . . . and all other persons . . . who might be claimed to 
be liable . . . from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of 
action . . . compensation or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever . . . 
[arising] from the alleged seizure of a dog, Baron.   
 
Upon completion and execution of the Foster Care Agreement, and 
placement of the dog under the terms of the Foster Care Agreement with . . 
. [Thomas, he] agrees to settle and discontinue the [pending] litigation.   
 
Under the terms of the Foster Care Agreement, Baron remained the property of the 
Humane Society, but resided with Thomas.  
On February 17, 2010, Thomas executed the Foster Care Agreement.  Two days 
later, the Humane Society delivered Baron to Thomas.  Accordingly, the District Court 
entered an order dismissing this case “without prejudice to the right of either party, upon 
good cause shown, to reinstate the action within sixty (60) days if the settlement is not 
consummated.”  Approximately one month later, on March 19, 2010, Thomas moved to 
reinstate this action.  The District Court denied the motion because settlement was 
consummated when the Humane Society return Baron, and Thomas had failed to show 
good cause for why the litigation should be reinstated.  Thomas appealed.     
II.  Discussion 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We have held that the law of the forum state applies in construing the terms of a 
general release. Three Rivers Motor Co. v. Ford Motors Co., 522 F.2d 885, 892 (3d Cir. 
1975).  Under Pennsylvania law, “[a] signed release is binding upon the parties unless 
executed and procured by fraud, duress, accident or mutual mistake.” Id. (citing Kent v. 
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Fair, 140 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1958)); see Strickland v. Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 986 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
The crux of Thomas‟s claim is that the settlement agreement is unenforceable 
because he was coerced into signing the General Release “by the broken bond of love for 
his dog.”  Essentially, Thomas asserts that “duress . . . forced [him to sign the agreement 
and] . . .  take every opportunity that he could to restore his bond of love with his dog.” 
(Id. at 17.)  However, under Pennsylvania law, “[d]uress is not established merely by 
showing that the release was given under pressure.” Three Rivers Motor Co., 522 F.2d at 
893.  Rather, “where the contracting party is free to come and go and to consult with 
counsel, there can be no duress in the absence of threats of actual bodily harm.” Id.; see 
Carrier v. William Penn Broad. Co., 233 A.2d 519, 521 (Pa. 1967).  Here, Thomas was 
represented by counsel throughout the entire mediation and has not alleged or presented 
any evidence that he was threatened with bodily harm if he did not sign the General 
Release.  Consequently, his claim of duress is insufficient to void the settlement 
agreement. 
Thomas also asserts that this case must be reinstated with respect to John Doe 
a/k/a/ Officer Weaver because Weaver was not a party to the mediation or to the General 
Release.  This argument is meritless.  Thomas signed a general release that by its terms 
applied to “all other persons . . . who might be claimed liable,” for claims arising out of 
the alleged seizure of Baron.  Although Weaver was neither present at the mediation or 
specifically mentioned in this release, he is, nonetheless, discharged from any alleged 
liability because Thomas‟s claims against him arose from the incident with Baron. Taylor 
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v. Solberg, 778 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa. 2001) (“When the parties to a release agree not to sue 
each other or anyone else for a given event, this can effect a discharge of others who have 
not contributed consideration for the release.  This is true even if the language of the 
release is general, releasing, for example, „any and all other persons‟ rather than 
specifically naming the persons released”) (internal citations omitted).  The District 
Court, therefore, did not err when it denied Thomas‟s motion to reinstate the litigation 
against Weaver.        
III.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
